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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The dissenting opinion argued that the parties had not provided
in their contract that Section 240-a should not be operative and the
contract thereby came within the purview of the statute. Further,
since the statute does not provide for specific performance with an
abatement where the loss is material, the defendant was correct in
tendering the down payment plus the cost of title search.
The dissent, it would seem, is too narrow an interpretation since
it would prevent the purchaser from obtaining the specific res for
which he bargained. Historically, in an action by the vendee for
specific performance, equity is more liberal in exercising jurisdiction.8
There is greater reason for affording aid of the court to the pur-
chaser who seeks specific execution of the agreement and who is
desirous of taking the part which the vendor can convey.9 The pur-
chaser can require specific performance with abatement even though
the damage or defect is material.' 0 Clearly, the statute does not in-
tend to deny the vendee a right so well rooted in the law and so
equitable in result.
J.V.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-MONOPOLY-ACTUAL EXCLUSION OF
COMPETITION.-The petitioners, American Tobacco Company, Lig-
gett & Myers Tobacco Company and R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Com-
pany,' dominate the national domestic cigarette production with a
substantial monopoly amounting to over two-thirds of the entire
domestic field of all cigarettes, the opposition being confined to six
small competitors. The evidence tends to show that the petitioners
conspired to fix and control prices and other material conditions re-
lating to the purchase of raw material in the form of leaf tobacco for
use in the manufacture of cigarettes and to exclude undesired com-
petition against them in the purchase of leaf tobacco. It also appears
to have been a conspiracy to fix and control prices and other material
conditions relating to the distribution and sale of cigarettes and to
exclude undesired competition. All these practices tended to keep
them in their dominant position and demonstrate a power and intent
on their part to exclude competition. The trial court charged the
jury that ". . . the term 'monopolize' as used in Section 2 of the
Sherman Act,2 as well as in the last three counts of the Information,
s Waters v. Travis, 9 Johns. 450, 464 (N. Y. 1812).
OSee Erwin v. Myers, 46 Pa. 96, 106 (1863).
10 5 PomFRoy, EQuiTY JuRIsPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1919) § 2256.
' Hereinafter referred to as American, Liggett and Reynolds, and "Big
Three."2
"Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall
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means the joint acquisition or maintenance by the members of a con-
spiracy formed for that purpose, of the power to control and domi-
nate interstate trade and commerce in a comnwdity to such an extent
that they are able, as a group, to exclude actual or potential competi-
tors from the field, accompanied with the intention and purpose to
exercise such power.... An essential element of the illegal monopoly
or monopolization charged in this case is the existence of a combina-
tion or conspiracy to acquire and maintain the power to exclude cofl-
petitors to a substantial extent. Thus you will see that an indis-
pensable ingredient of each of the offenses charged i the Information
is a combination or conspiracy." 3 (Italics are the court's.) Ameri-
can, Liggett, Reynolds, American Suppliers, Inc., a subsidiary of
American, and certain officials of the respective companies were con-
victed by a jury in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Kentucky, of violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act 4 on four counts: (1) Conspiracy in restraint of trade,
(2) Monopolization, (3) Attempt to monopolize, and (4) Conspiracy
to monopolize. The third count was held merged in the second.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed each
conviction.5 On petition for certiorari the Supreme Court considered
all grounds for review of these judgments and granted the petitions
but limited each to the question ". . . whether actual exclusion of
competitors is necessary to the crime of monopolization under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act." 6 Petitioners argue that Section 2 of
the Sherman Act should be interpreted to require proof of actual ex-
clusion of competitors in order to show "monopolization," and they
claim that only thus can a "conspiracy to monopolize" trade be suf-
ficiently differentiated from a "conspiracy in restraint of" trade as
to avoid subjecting the parties accused under those counts to double
jeopardy, or to a multiplicity of punishment in a single proceeding,
therefore violating the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Held, affirmed. Actual exclusion of competitors is not necessary to
the crime of monopolization. ". . . [It is] the crime of monopolizing,
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, for parties, as in these cases,
to combine or conspire to acquire or maintain the power to exclude
competitors from any part of the trade or commerce among the sev-
eral states or with foreign nations, provided they also have such a
power that they are able, as a group, to exclude actual or potential
competition from the field and provided that they have the intent
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be pun-
ished by fine not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding one year,
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court." 26 STAT. 209
(1890), 15 U. S. C. §2 (1940).
3 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, - U. S. -, 90 L. ed. 1095,
1098 (1946).
426 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2 (1940).
5 147 F. (2d) 93 (1944).
6 324 U. S. 836, 89 L. ed. 1400 (1945).
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and purpose to exercise that power." 7 The offenses of conspiracy in
restraint of trade and conspiracy to monopolize trade, made punish-
able under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, are reciprocally distinguishable from and independent of each
other, although the objects of the conspiracies may partially overlap.
Anwrican Tobacco Co.,v. United States, - U. S. -, 90 L. ed. 1095
(1946).
The court distinguishes between this case and those cited by
petitioners 8 as authority for their contention that unless Section 2
of the Sherman Act be interpreted to require proof of actual exclu-
sion of competitors in order to show "monopolization," petitioners
will be subjected to double jeopardy because there is but one con-
spiracy, namely a conspiracy to fix prices. "In contrast to the single
conspiracy described in... [the Bravernan 9] case in separate counts,
... all charged under the general conspiracy statute,10 . . . we have
here separate statutory offenses, one a conspiracy in restraint of trade
that may stop short of monopoly and the other a conspiracy to
monopolize that may not be content with restraint short of monopoly.
One is made criminal by § 1 and the other by § 2 of the Sherman
Act." "I The court continues: "We believe also that in accordance
with the Blockburger case,12 §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act require
proof of conspiracies which are reciprocally distinguishable from and
independent of each other although the objects of the conspiracy may
partially overlap.18 . . . In the present cases, the court below has
found that there was more than sufficient evidence to establish a con-
spiracy in restraint of trade by price fixing and other means, and
also a conspiracy to monopolize trade with the power and intent to
exclude actual and potential competitors from at least a part of the
tobacco industry." 14
In answer to petitioners' suggestion that the second count (to
monopolize), and the fourth count (to conspire to monopolize), may
lead to multiple punishment since the Government's theory of
monopolization calls for proof of a joint enterprise with power and
intent to exclude competitors and, therefore, that the conspiracy to
monopolize must be a part of that proof, the court states that it has
long been settled that a "conspiracy to commit a crime is a different
7 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, - U. S. -, 90 L. ed. 1095,
1110 (1946).
S Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49, 87 L. ed. 23 (1942) ; Block-
burger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 76 L. ed. 306 (1932).
9 Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49, 87 L. ed. 23 (1942).
1035 STAT. 1096 (1909), 18 U. S. C. § 88 (1940).
11 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, - U. S. -, 90 L. ed. 1095,
1099 (1946).
l2 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 76 L. ed. 306 (1932).
'13 See United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 226, 84
L. ed. 1129, 1170 (1940).
134 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, - U. S. -, 90 L. ed. 1095,
1099 (1946).
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offense from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy. . ..
Petitioners, for example, might have been convicted of a conspiracy
to monopolize without ever having acquired the power to carry out
the object of the conspiracy, i.e., to exclude actual and potential com-
petitors from the cigarette field." 16 The court also points out that
to support the verdict it was not necessary to show power and intent
to exclude all competitors, or to show a conspiracy to exclude all
competitors. All that is required is that the offenders shall "monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations." It is not the form of the combination or the
particular means used but the result to be achieved that the statute
condemns. It is unimportant whether the means used to accomplish
the unlawful objective are in themselves lawful or unlawful. "Acts
done to give effect to the conspiracy may be in themselves wholly
innocent acts. Yet, if they are part of the sum of the acts which are
relied upon to effectuate the conspiracy which the statute forbids, they
come within its prohibition." 1T
The Government failed to discover any written or express agree-
ment among American, Liggett, and Reynolds to commit the acts
for which they were convicted but did show sufficient practices from
which could be spelled out the unlawful conspiracy. As the court
points out, "No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an un-
lawful conspiracy.... Where the conspiracy is proved, as here, from
the evidence of the action taken in concert by the parties to it, it is
all the more convincing proof of an intent to exercise the power of
exclusion acquired through that conspiracy. The essential combina-
tion or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be found in
a course of dealings or other circumstances as well as in any ex-
change of words .... 12 Where the circumstances are such as to
warrant a jury in finding that the conspirators had a unity of pur-
pose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds
in an unlawful arrangement, the conclusion that a conspiracy is estab-
lished is justified." 19
The material consideration in determining whether or not a
monopoly exists is not that prices are raised and that competition
actually is excluded but that power exists to raise prices or to ex-
clude competition when it is desired to do So.20 The court cites
15 See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 85, 59 L. ed. 1211, 1213
(1915).
16 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, - U. S. -, 90 L. ed. 1095,
1100 (1946).
IT Id. at 1110.18 United States v. Schraeder's Son Inc., 252 U. S. 85, 64 L. ed. 471 (1920).19 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, - U. S. -, 90 L. ed. 1095,
1110 (1946).2 0 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 Fed. 700, 721 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1908), remanded for further proceedings, 221 U. S. 106, 55 L. ed. 663
(1911).
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with approval United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.2 ' In
that case the court says: "Indeed it would be absurd to condemn
such [price fixing] contracts unconditionally, and not to extend the
condemnation to monopolies; for the contracts are only steps toward
that entire control which monopoly confers; they are really partial
monopolies .... So far as concerns the public interest, it can make
no difference whether an existing competition is put an end to, or
whether prospective competition is prevented. . . . [Alcoa] insists
that it never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more
effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new oppor-
tunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity
already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of ex-
perience, trade connections and the elite of personnel. Only in case
we interpret 'exclusion' as limited to manoeuvres not honestly in-
dustrial, but actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition, can
such a course, indefatigably pursued, be deemed not 'exclusionary.'
So to limit it would in our judgment emasculate the Act; would
permit just such consolidations as it was designed to prevent. In
order to fall within § 2, the monopolist must have both the power to
monopolize, and the intent to monopolize. To read the passage as
demanding any 'specific' intent, makes nonsense of it, for no monopo-
list monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing." 22
The proof of monopolization by American, Liggett, and Reynolds
depends upon their dominance and control over purchases of the raw
material and over the sale of the finished product in the form of
cigarettes. In each of the years 1937, 1938 and 1939, American,
Liggett, and Reynolds expended a total of over $40,000,000 a year
for advertising, there being a very close relationship between their
large expenditures for national advertising of cigarettes and resulting
:olumes of sales. It would be exceedingly difficult for new firms to
enter into competition with them without sufficient capital for adver-
tising on such a large scale. In addition, the "Big Three's" consis-
tent pattern of conduct indicates a close relationship between them
and concert of action. In the words of the court: "A friendly re-
lationship within such a long established industry is, in itself, not
only natural but commendable and beneficial, as long as it does not
breed illegal activities. Such a community of interest in any industry,
however, provides a natural foundation for working policies and
understandings favorable to the insiders and unfavorable to out-
siders." 23
The enforcement of the Sherman Act has on occasion been criti-
cized in some quarters for blocking "normal growth and expansion
in industry," or condemning size per se. In this case it was found
21 148 F. (2d) 416 (1946).
22 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. (2d) 416, 427 (1946).
23 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, - U. S. -, 90 L. ed. 1095,
1102 (1946).
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that their comparative size on such a great scale inevitably increased
the power of American, Liggett, and Reynolds to dominate all phases
of their industry. As said by the court in United States v. Swift &
Co.: 24 "Size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to
te ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been utilized in
the past."
The decision in this case is another landmark in the fight to
attain and maintain a truly free and competitive economy. The
growth of America can be attributed to a large extent to our com-
petitive system. The fact that "prevention" is better than "cure" is
well known. It is far better to keep industry open for competition
than to wait until there has been an actual case of exclusion, with
resultant damage to the individual excluded as well as to the nation
as a whole.
J. E. Y.
TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH-DEATH OF DEFENDANT-ABATE-
MENT AND REvIVAL.-In December 1943, Ephrem Mounsey killed
Dr. Verne Hunt by deliberately shooting him with a revolver.
Mounsey thereafter took his own life. Surviving Dr. Hunt were the
plaintiffs, who are his widow and three minor children. They filed
a claim against Mounsey's estate for $150,000 for "waste and destruc-
tion of their property rights," which was rejected.' This action is
an appeal by the plaintiffs from the judgment dismissing their cause
of action after the defendant's demurrer thereto had been sustained.
Held, reversed, claim allowed. Hun v. Authier, - Cal. -, 169 P.
(2d) 913 (1946).
At common law, all actions or causes ex delicto died with the
person by whom or to whom the wrong was done,2 with the possible
exception of the survival to the injured person's estate in cases of
asportation of and damage to chattels, and against the tort-feasor's
estate for wrongs whereby the latter was benefited. 3 Upon the death
of the victim, Dr. Hunt, a cause of action for wrongful death arose
on behalf of the widow and children under the wrongful death statute
and continued to exist until the tort-feasor's death.4 This action was
not brought under the wrongful death statute as such action has been
held to abate upon the death of the tort-feasor. However, another
section of the code provided that "any person, or the personal repre-
24 286 U. S. 106, 116, 76 L. ed. 999, 1006 (1932).
'Hunt v. Authier, 161 P. (2d) 487 (1945).
2 Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
3 (1330) 4 Edw. III, c. 7; (1351) 25 Edw. III, c. 5.
4 CAX. CODE CIV. PROC. § 377.
5 Clark v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 527, 150 Pac. 357 (1915).
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